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Abstract The past five years of revolutionary guerrilla warfare in
Vietnam can best be described as a highly sophisticated "third generation? of
political-armed struggle, the essence of which is communication. Each act of
the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (or Viet Cong) including its
guerrilla attacks and violence program, basically is conceived, not in military
terms, but in terms of the communication of ideas. Although the NLF employs
mass media as well as the traditional informal channels of communication,
these are mere reinforcements, and its main effort is concentrated on the
social organization or social movement as a channel of communication. Since
the NLF seeks victory by means of the Organizational Weapon, it follows that
only counter-organizational efforts put to work as communication tools-and
supplemented by military operations and civic action programs-can reverse
the tide.
In a sense, the communication of ideas is what the struggle in Vietnam
is all about. In the past, the guerrilla organization, for example the maquis
in France during World War Two, was only mildly interested in explaining
itself, for it assumed that everyone knew what it stood for and either supported
it or not. The National Liberation Front took nothing for granted and spent
enormous amounts of time, manpower, and money in explaining itself-to it-
self, to the other side in Vietnam, and to the world at large. It developed a
vertical liberation association structure to ensure the continual flow of "'pure"y
1
2messages from its central committee to the Vietnamese village. And it devel-
oped a horizontal structure of liberation associations, at the village level, as a
self-reinforcing communicational device and to insure a constant audience. Its
military arm kept open the channels of communication, blocked the communi-
cation efforts of the Government of Vietnam, and provided informational input,
such as military victories, for its own system. It employed some four thousand
agit-prop workers who tirelessly beat the back country in the name of the
cause.
However, it was not the ideas themselves that were so much in conflict
as it was the manner of communication. The communists masked well their
ideology, and their thought-that is to say, Marxism-Leninism-rarely broke
the surface in public. Indeed, the avowed goals of the NLF and the long stated
objectives of the Government of Vietnam found no grounds for argument. The
NLF slogan, which appeared in ail of its public and internal documents, was:
peace, unity, independence, and democracy. The Government of Vietnam stood
for these, and in fact what government does not? The competition, therefore,
was in the arena of communication. The battle was fought on the field of ways,
of means, of infrastructure.
The father of the NLF was the Viet Minh, the force that defeated the
French. Its grandfather was the Chinese Communist revolution. However, the
grandson was far more sophisticated than his forebears. If the heart of the
Chinese Communist revolution was strategy, if the heart of the Viet Minh war
3was spirit, then the heart of the NLF was communication-and specifically,
communication by means of the social movement.
Perhaps if I use the homely example of the education of Douglas Pike
in Vietnam, the nature and the power of this communist tool may appear in
somewhat sharper relief. I came out of American mass media, having been
a newsman before joining USIA. And although most of my experience had been
abroad, in Asia, I considered mass media the end all of communication. One
does not have to be in Vietnam very long to realize that mass media there is
not a particularly promising means of communication. Not only is the coun-
try's mass media weak, but even more importantly, the Vietnamese population
is unconditioned to mass media appeals. Our first efforts were to help the
Vietnamese build a mass media structure. Since time was of the essence, we
also attempted to utilize traditional channels of communication, the so-called
informal channels such as word of mouth, face-to-face, itinerant travelers,
rumors, and so forth. These, we discovered, were effective for certain types
of information but not others. And as an operator I discovered they were un-
dependable- some information couid be moved through them and some could
not.
In searching for other methods it occurred to me that the NLF faced
the same problem, and so I began an investigation of that organization to see
how it handled its communication. It soon became apparent that the NLF was
4one vast communication device, and I spent the next three years studying it
seriously. I accumulated a mountain of data which, during the past year at
MIT's Center for International Studies, I have turned into a book that will be
published this fall by The MIT Press under the title: VIET CONG.
I came to realizewhatthe NLF leadership clearly had realized from the
start-what unfortunateiy is all too poorly understood in the United States-that
social organizations are a potent communication device, especially in under-
developed countries. Yet, this process is in no way alien to Americans with
their strong proclivity for the voluntary organization. Examples lay all about
us. The Boy Scout movement, for instance, transmits and inculcates a whole
complex of beliefs, the scope of which is indicated by the 12 Scout laws.
A college fraternity can heavily indoctrinate an impressionable youth, shape
his political beliefs and his economic values-even dictate what sort of a wife
to choose. This is done not as a pre-meditated brainwashing scheme, but
simply as a by-product function of the organizational essence or nature of its
being. What the NLF did was deliberately to create such an organizational
structure, specifically to transmit information and data, as well as ideals,
beliefs, and values.
I might, before leaving this conceptual framework, note our experience
in Vietnam with respect to the three channels of communication: traditional,
mass media, and organizational; and in relation to the three levels of commun-
5ication: data-or what is said; interpretation-or the meaning, and evaluation-
or what might be called the "so what. " A chart best illustrates it:
Channel Data Interpretation Evaluation
Traditional excellent but good but un usually only
Channei selective dependable implied
Mass Media very good but good but poor
Channel restricted restricted
Organizational exceilent very good excellent
Channel
Thus, it came about that in the social movement as a communication
device, I found the solution to the mystery which for so long puzzled knowl
edgeable and thinking Americans: How could the NLF achieve success in the
face of overwhelming GVN a nd American miittar y superiority and despite the
massive inputs c American material resources for civic acticn programs to
allieviate economic grievances? Net superior ideology, not more dedicated
personnel, ne because voluntary support of the villager had been won, but
because of the social movement shaped into a self-contained, self-,supporting
channel of communicain=crthat was the NLF2s secret weapon.
Working from the fundamental assumption that if an idea could be rooted
in the group it would become strong, durable, and infinitely more difficult to
counter, the NLF created a communication structure far beyond any simple
6propaganda organization, and p"lunged to depths far below more surface accept-
ance of a message by an individual. In the hands of the agit-prop cadres, the
social movement as a communicational device made these 7 contributions to
the NLF cause:
1. It generated a sense of community, both by developing a pattern of
political thought and behavior appropriate to the social probiems of the rural
Vietnamese village in the midst; of sharp social change, and by providing a
basis for group action that alliowed the individual viiager to see that his own
efforts could have meaning and effect.
2. As an crganizaticnal armature, it mobilzed the people, generating
discontent where it did not exist, exacerbating and harnessing it where it did,
and increasing, especialIy at the viilage level, the saliency of all the NLF
appeal s.
3. It altered to at least some degree vfinager information input, per=
ception of the world, attitude toward government and daily actions in and out
of the village. It changed underlying beliefs and even caused villagers to do
things to their own disadvantage.
4. In a self-reinforcing manner, it fostered integration of the NLF
belief system, turning heterogeneous attitudes into homogeneous ones. The
social facilitation or interstimulation which resulted canalized and intensified
village feelings, reactions, and aims. Thus it came to pass that even when
the NLF organization turned coercive, as it finaly did, members continued
to hold imported and alien values and norms.
75. It greatly facilitated the NLF's efforts to polarize belief, stereotype
anti-NLF forces, and generally shift villager attention in the directions chosen
by the NLF leadership. As does any social organization, it caused the villager
to rationalize more easily, being influenced by those around him. Since re-
sistance to suggestion., that is critical judgement, is less within a group, it
caused him to accept spurious arguments more easily, allowed him to succumb
more quickly to emotional appeais or perscnal appeals by the cadres and the
village NLF leaders. Once critical judgement was impaired, the villager soon
came to confuse desire with conviction.
6. Once momentum in the group was devieloped, the group itself tended
to restrict the freedom of expression to the sentiment acceptable to the
NLF-created group norms. The individual became submerged, the group be-
came the unit, and great sociai pressure was brought to bear against the
deviant, thus achieving the u'stimate NLF objective: A self-reguiating, self-
perpetuating revolutionary force.
7. Finally, because it helped cut social interaction and communication
with the sociai system represented by the GVN, it iso'ated the villagers and
heightened the sense of confict between the two systems.
The significance of the social movement as a communication device, the
successes it has delivered to date to the NLF, and the danger it poses to other
developing nations, cannot be stated too strongly.
8It follows, therefore, that neither military operations nor civic-action
programs-important as they are-can themselves reverse the NLF tide. The
Organizational Weapon promises the communists victory. Only the counter
organizational effort can turn back this tide. This means the creation in
Vietnam-or anywhere else where danger lies-of viable organizations that
reach from the capital to the village, organizations that provide a payoff to the
villagers, either in material or non-material personal benefits, organizations
which once established legitimately can be used as channels of communication.
And since the proper counter organizational weapon pays off in real and
material benefits, the doubly attractive thing about it is that both the individual
and his country gain in a muItitude of ways, above and beyond simply halting
communist aggression.
